Now, however, a deciding ground of a different kind comes into play so as to turn the scale in this irresolution of speculative reason. The command to promote the highest good is based objectively (in practical reason); its possibility in general is likewise objectively based (in theoretical reason, which has nothing against it). But as for the way we are to to represent this possibility, whether in accordance to with universal laws of nature without a wise author presiding over nature or only on the supposition of such an author, reason cannot decide this objectively. Now a subjective condition of reason enters into this, the only way in which it is theoretically possible for it to think the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good, and at the same time the only way that is conducive to morality (which is subject to an objective law of reason). [...]
If human nature is called to strive for the highest good, it must also be assumed to have the measure of its cognitive faculties, especially their relation to one another, is suitable to this end. Now, the Critique of pure speculative reason proves its utter insufficiency for solving, conformably with this end, the most important problems that are proposed to it, although the Critique does not fail to recognize the natural hints of this same reason, which are not to be overlooked, nor the great steps that it can take to approach this great goal that is set before it, which, however, it can never reach itself, even with the aid of the greatest cognition of nature. Nature then seems here to have provided for us a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty needed for our end. (p.257)
When this is well established, when a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on self-examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting impulses from breaking into the mind. (p.269)
If human nature is called to strive for the highest good, it must also be assumed to have the measure of its cognitive faculties, especially their relation to one another, is suitable to this end. Now, the Critique of pure speculative reason proves its utter insufficiency for solving, conformably with this end, the most important problems that are proposed to it, although the Critique does not fail to recognize the natural hints of this same reason, which are not to be overlooked, nor the great steps that it can take to approach this great goal that is set before it, which, however, it can never reach itself, even with the aid of the greatest cognition of nature. Nature then seems here to have provided for us a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty needed for our end. (p.257)
When this is well established, when a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on self-examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting impulses from breaking into the mind. (p.269)
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